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THE EUROPEAN UNION: FROM AN AGGREGATE
OF STATES TO A LEGAL PERSON?
Esa Paasivirta*

I. INTRODUCTION.
The European Union (EU or the Union) was created by the Treaty
on the European Union (TEU), (concluded at Maastricht, The Netherlands, on February 7, 1992, which entered into force on November 1,
1993.1) The Union is founded on the three existing Communities - the
European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and
supplemented by policies and new areas of cooperation established by the
TEU. The two new areas of cooperation were the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) and the cooperation in justice and home affairs
(JHA). Both of these new areas now fall within the competence of the
Union rather than the European Community. They are implemented
according to an intergovernmental method rather than the supranational
community method
The TEU raises complex issues about the nature of the Union and
its relationship to the three European Communities Although the field
of European integration has been broadened by the creation of the EU,
the legal and institutional powers of the Union remain limited. The TEU,

* Esa Paasivirta, Member of the Legal Service of the European Commission, Brussels; L.L.B.
University of Turku; L.L.Lic., University of Helsinki; Ph.D., University of Cambridge. The views
reflected in this paper are strictly personal. I wish to thank Allan Rosas for his comments.
1. 1993 OJ. (L.293)61 (entry into force of the Treaty followed ratification by parliaments of
12, as it then was, Member States, on certain cases, France, Germany, Denmark and Ireland after
approval by referendum); Fed. Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 35
I.L.M. 388 1994. (In Germany, the entry into force of the Treaty was preceded by the Federal
Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of Oct. 12, 1993, which allowed Germany
to ratify the Treaty.).
2. See generally, P. Demaret, The Treaty Framework; in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY 3 (D. O'Keeffe and P.M. Twomey eds., Wiley Chancery Law 1994).
3. See generally, D. Curtin, The ConstitutionalStructure of the Union: A Europe ofBits and
Pieces, 30 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 17 (1993).
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unlike the treaties establishing the three European Communities, 4 fell
short of investing the Union with international legal personality.
The absence of international legal personality has significant
ramifications, especially for the conduct of the CFSP and its implementing legal instruments. After the Maastricht Treaty, the legal structure of
the European Union can be presented schematically as follows (see
CHART on following page).
As the Chart shows, the European Communities did not disappear
with the establishment of the European Union. Instead, the Union forms
an umbrella-like concept which covers the three communities, forming
one of the three pillars of the Union. The first pillar, or Community
pillar, is marked by its supranational nature, whereas the second and third
pillars operate on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation between the
Member states. The three pillars are linked through a single institutional
framework and the common provisions (Article A-F) and the final
provisions apply to all three pillars.
This paper examines the question of the legal personality of the EU
in the area of external relations by first discussing the general policy
aspects of legal personality, by secondly considering the international
legal personality of international organizations, and finally by assessing
the specific legal personality of the European Union with particular
reference to CFSP matters, taking into account the recent developments
of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) as far as the legal personality issue
is concerned. Otherwise the references are made to the TEU as it is in
force today.
II. THE POLICY ASPECTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITIES.
It is axiomatic that law provides a framework for social relations
and for the allocation and distribution of power and resources amongst
the members of a society. Society, in turn, applies enforcement machinery to specific sets of social relations perscribed by law. Each society
also defines the range of persons who can access resources and dispose
of them in accordance with law, and identifies who may invoke law to
get their rights enforced.

4. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951. Art. 6.;
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, Art. 210; Treaty

Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1951. Art. 184. The Constituent
treaties of the three communities are contained in I EUROPEAN UNION: SELECTED INSTRUMENTS
TAKEN FROM THE TREATIES. Vols. I-II. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the

European Communities, 1995.
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according to Treaty on European Union (TEU),
done at Maastricht in 1992, and recently amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam (1997).*
Title I of the Treaty on European Union:
Common Provisions
(Articles A to F)
Pillar II

Pillar I
European Communities
European
Community
(Previously:
European
Economic
Community)
Rome 1957.
Amended by
Title II of the
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European Union (inter alia
by the addition and
Monetary Union) and by
the Treaty of
Amsterdam
(1997)*

European
Coal and
Steel Community
Paris
1951. Latest amendment by
Title III of
the Treaty
on European Union

European
Atomic Energy Commu
nity
Rome 1957.
Latest amendment By
Title IV of
the Treaty
on European
Union

I

Pillar III

I
Co-operation
Foreign
And Securi- in the Field
ty Policy
Of Justice
(Article J). and Home
Added by
Affairs
Title V of
(Article K).
the Treaty Added by
on Europe- Title VI of
the Treaty
an Union.
Recently
on Euroamended by pean Unthe Treaty ion.
of Amster- Recently
amended
dam
(1997)*
by the
Treaty of
Amsterdam
(1997)*
Common

Title VII of the Treaty on European Union:
Final Provisions (Articles L-S)
* Not yet in force.
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Generally, only a legal person can be a subject of legal rights and
obligations. This implies that not everybody is eligible to participate in
law and society in the same way. Some members of a society may be
excluded or have their access to law significantly restricted. To have
access to resources of a society and to take part in the exercise of power,
a member of the society must have a certain standing and certain
recognized capacities. In other words, an individual has a standing in a
society when he or she is considered a legal personality. Only then is an
individual entitled to participate fully in the sharing of power and
resources and to invoke the special protection that society provides for
the enforcement of rights.
Lack of standing as a legal personality bars a person from participating in important social activities, such as owning property, entering into
contracts and voting in elections. In ancient Roman law, a distinction in
legal capacity was drawn between a citizen (civis), capable of managing
his own affairs (sui generis), and mere inhabitants under the control of
others (alieni juris). In old English law, the list of individuals who were
not considered to be legal persons included infants, lunatics, idiots, jews,
monks, and married women. In the United States, (at various times and
in various settings) women, African and Native Americans have been,
excluded from the original scope of "We the People" in the Constitution.5
Groups of individuals (rather than individuals by themselves) also
may be recognized collectively as legal or juristic persons in a variety of
forms. At times groups of individuals in the form of corporations, towns,
churches, and states are viewed in the eyes of law as one body, a corpus
with specific powers, like the power to buy and sell. This collective legal
standing is accomplished with the help of the concept of a persona, a
legal artefact originally denoting the mask worn by an actor. 6
Such groups are treated in the same way as individual legal persons.
They may own property, enter into contracts and have their rights
protected and enforced.
The bestowal upon such non-legal persons of legal personality
involves a limited degree of social engineering. At the same time, the
bestowals of legal capacity upon non-persons need not either contravene
the interests of pre-existing legal persons or be adopted for altruistic
reasons. For example, the inclusion of married women among those

5.
6.

LISA J. McINTYRE, LAW IN THE SOCIOLOGIcAL ENTERPRISE 38 (Westview Press 1994).
Id, at 32, 33.
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having legal personality was advocated by fathers to protect family
estates and not to better the lot of married women.7 And the recognition
of legal personality for corporations was primarily to improve efficient
allocation of society's resources and was only secondarily to bestow
benefits on the members of society at large.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
In domestic society, the original members tend to control for a time
the granting or withholding of legal personality to other subsequent
entities and actors in that society. The same is true in international
society.
The "original" members of modem international legal society are
states. And states control the admission of new states and other entities
into membership in international legal society. They have exercised such
control through devices such as recognition, diplomatic relations,
consular relations, treaties, etc. Today, however, with the expansion of
domestic societal life beyond national borders, an increasing number of
specific social functions, relating to inter-nation peace, economy and
welfare, have become arranged, not by states directly, but by international organizations created by states. These international organizations
necessarily have a degree of international legal personality in order to
function as intended.
That said, present international legal society is significantly more
restrictive than present national societies in the range of entities and
persons who have legal personality. In international legal society, there
is no general code to require automatic recognition of legal persons when
certain general conditions are fulfilled as is the case with, for example,
private and public corporations. In general, bestowal of international legal
personality remains an exclusively reserved option of states. This is
especially true with regard to bestowal of international legal personality
on international organizations. This very limited pathway to legal
personality in international society reflects the historical operation of
international law, which has been first and foremost to regulate relations
among states. Only incidentally did states allow international law to
permit recognition of non-state actors as having elements of international
legal personality. When states did allow such limited personality for

7.

Id, at 85.
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international organizations, it was usually accomplished through the form
of the treaty that created the international organization. This treaty source
for the legal personality of international organizations has inhibited
subsequent claims to enhanced capacity or standing for international
organizations on the basis of need or changed circumstances.
International law doctrine today reflects three basic approaches to
the issue of legal personality of international organizations.' The first is
the contract or subjective theory approach, which holds that the legal
personality of an international organization derives from the will of states
explicitly attributed to the organization in a constitutive treaty. This
treaty-contract approach was especially supported by socialist countries,
but it has generally lost its appeal with the collapse of communism. This
state-centered, restrictive contract theory of personality also has been
difficult to uphold in the post-Second World War period, with a rapid
growth of a large number of specialized international organizations which
exercise legal personality even though their constitutive instruments
provisions do not explicitly confer legal personality.
The second approach is the objective theory which suggests that if
an organization operates in a sufficiently autonomous manner, it may
possess legal personality ipso facto in addition to that conferred by
constitutive instruments. Today, most of those organizations, apart from
their constitutive treaties, do possess some degree of international legal
personality and do act in their own name on the international stage to
carry out their assigned or implicit tasks.9
Under this objective theory for personality, autonomy arises
generally when an organization both is not subject to the jurisdiction of
any particular state and is endowed with an organ the function of which
is to express the will of the organization.'0 Here, the source of legal
personality is not so much the subjective and explicit will of states as it
is international law determined from objectively viewed criteria. The
8. See W. BENEDEK, Diz RECHTsORDRUNG DES GATT AUS VOLKERRECHTICHER SICHT 256258 (1990); H.G. SCHERMERS AND N.M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTiONAL LAW 978-979
(3rd ed. 1995).
9.

DEREK BowETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 339 (4th ed.

1982)

accurately states that "it is permissible to assume that most organizations created by a multilateral
intergovernmental agreement will, so far as they are endowed with functions on the international
plane, possess some measure of international personality in addition to the personality within the
systems of municipal law ... [t]he possession of such international personality will normally
involve, as a consequence, the attribution of power to make treaties, of privileges and immunities,
of power to contract and to undertake legal proceedings ... "
10. This approach has been developed by F. Seyersted, Objective InternationalPersonalityof
InternationalOrganization,NORDISK TIDSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET. 1-112 (1964).
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objective approach is often criticized for precisely this apparent disregard
of the will of the member states associated with a given organization.
That said, the objective theory accommodates (better than does the
contract theory) the rapid growth in number and the increasing activity
and relevance of international organizations.
The third approach, the implied powers or functional theory, is the
most widely accepted approach for determining international legal
personality. More often than not, the constitutive instruments of
international organizations do not contain an express provision conferring
legal personality upon the organization. In these circumstances, a
question arises whether an organization possesses legal personality.
Under the implied powers approach, personality derives indirectly from
the functions of the organization appropriately exercised through its
organs especially when that exercise demonstrates a will separate from
its members.
The movement of international society from a contract approach to
an implied powers approach to determine the nature and extent of
international legal personality has been confirmed by the International
Court of Justice. In the Reparationfor Injuries Case," the issue was
whether the United Nations could bring an international claim against a
responsible government for injuries suffered by an agent of the UN. The
Court employed the functional approach when it examined the concept
of legal personality of the UN by looking at the organization's implied
powers in its constitutive documents supplemented by later practice. The
ICJ concluded that the UN indeed possessed legal personality because the
constitutive instruments of the UN and subsequent UN practice established a status for the UN organization separate from its state members.
The Court noted that the UN Charter equipped the organization with its
own functioning organs that had unique tasks. The Court specifically
referred to Article 2(5) of the Charter that requires the members not only
to assist the organization in its tasks but also to refrain from acting on
their own when the UN acting through the organ of the Security Council
is itself taking preventive or enforcement action." The Court also
observed that member states agreed to grant the organization legal

11. Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 174, 178-179 (1949).
12. Article 2(5) of the UN Charter provides:

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
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personality and privileges and immunities in the territories of the
members and that the Charter specifically provided for the conclusion of
agreements between the organization and its members. In the opinion of
the Court:
The Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in
fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only
be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of
international personality and the capacity to operate on an
international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of
its founders if it was devoid of legal personality. It must be
acknowledged that its members, by entrusting certain functions
to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed
it with the competence required to enable those functions to be
effectively discharged... Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties. 3
Importantly for present purposes, the Court concluded that the UN
organization has international legal personality even without an express
provision conferring personality. The Court emphasized efficiency
considerations in analyzing the functions of the organization with regard
to legal personality. Here, it emphasized three main requisites for legal
personality: (1) legal personality must be indispensable to the achievement of the organization's objectives; (2) the organization must have its
own organs and special tasks; and (3) the organization itself must be
distinct from its member states (in the Reparations case this was
reflected both in the language of the UN Charter and in practice).14 The
Court thus rested its decision both on the implied powers doctrine and
the objectively determined characteristics of the UN organization. 15
The preference of most writers today is to include the implied
powers approach or functional approach to any analysis to determine
whether international organizations have international legal personali-

13. Supra note 11 at 179.
14. Schermers and Blokker, supra note 8 at 979.
15. Louis HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, OscAR SmAcHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 354-355 (3rd ed. 1993).
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ty."6 That preference corresponds to actual practice, at least where a
measure of personality is invoked on the basis of the constitutive
instrument of the organization rather than by applying objective criteria.
The modem complex concerns of states generally are more easily
accommodated under the implied powers approach then under the
objective approach because state permission or acquiesence remains at
least indirectly relevant.
Whichever theory is relied upon, an organization, once it has
international legal personality, is able to assert rights and accept
correlative duties on the international plane. The nature and content of
those rights and duties vary from one organization to another depending
on the organization's constitutive instruments. 7 The powers of the
organizations are thus limited in a primary sense to its purposes and
functions and it is probably accurate to refer to a functional personality
of international organizations.18
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION.
A.

The EU is distinctfrom its Member States and the three
Communities.

The examination of the international legal personality of the EU
requires an acceptance that the EU is distinct from its Member States and
the Communities, that it has but limited powers in CFSP matters (as well
as JHA matters), and that it has not been granted legal personality unlike
the three Communities. It is normally maintained that the EU lacks legal
personality.'9 However, it is not accurate to claim either that the EU is
legally non-existent or that it is not distinct from the Member States or
the existing three Communities.

16. Bowett, supra note 9 at 335; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
677, 680 (1990); M. Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personalioy and Implied Powers of
InternationalOrganizations,44 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL L. 111,147 (1970); Henkin
et al., supra note 15 at 356; Schermers and Blokker, supra note 8 at 979.
17. Bowett, supra note 9 at 337.
18. Schermers and Blokker, supra note 8 at p. 981.
19. U. Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29 COMMON MKT.
L.Rv. 1053, 1061 (1992); D. Curtin, supranote 3 at 27; A. BARAv AND C. PHIIUP, DICTfONNAIRE
JURIDIQUE DES COMmtJNAUTs EUROPENNES. 1142 (Presses Universitaires de France 1993); M.R.
Eaton, Common Foreignand Security Policy in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra

note 2 at 224; P.S.R.F. MATHYISEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 5 (Sweet and Maxwell 6th
ed. 1995) (noting that the EU has political rather than legal significance).
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A number of provisions of the TEU clearly contemplate and
generally treat the EU distinct from the Member States (and the three
Communities.) The TEU provides that the Member States "establish
among themselves a European Union", which "marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe .

.20

While this clearly creates an entity distinct from the

Member States, the TEU also reflects the view that the EU is a "process", rather than a fully formed legal personality (let alone a new federal
state). 21 However, that reference to "an ever closer union" when linked
to the principle of subsidiarity clearly implies a certain sense of hierarchy
probably best explainable in terms of a federal framework.22
Unquestionably, the Union does have its own tasks and objectives.
Its primary task is "to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency
and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their
peoples".23 In addition, the objectives of the Union include the promotion of economic and social progress; the assertion of "its identity on the
international scene", in particular through the implementation of the
CFSP, and the strengthening of "the protection of the rights and interests
of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a
citizenship of the Union".24
The distinct nature of the Union is also implied by the separate
presence of the principle of subsidiarity in the constitutive treaties, both
for the Union25 and for the European Community.26 The Union is to
ensure internal consistency and continuity of the activities of the Union
in general, respecting the acquis communautaire and, in particular, to
"ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole".27
The Union's separateness from the Member States is also reflected
in its institutions. For example, the Union is served by "a single

20. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, Art. A, 29 I.L.M. 247,255 1992.
21. J. CLOOS, G. REINESCH, G. VIGREs AND D. WEYLAND, LE TRAITE DE MAASTRiCHT 115-

116 (Bruylant 2d.ed. 1994) (An explicit reference to a federal goal was removed from the treaty text
during the final stages of Maastricht negotiations. An earlier draft, of June 18, 1991, still contained
an explicit statement to a federal goal. The French text referred to a "proccessus graduel m6nant A

une union A vocation f6ddrale". However, the "F-word", as referred to by the British press, was
opposed by the British, who took it to imply increasing centralization; whereas in states arranged
according to a federalist model it is, in fact, taken to imply the opposite.
22. Ibid at 115.

23. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article A, supra note 20 at 255.
24. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article B, supra note 20 at 255.

25. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article B, supra note 20 at 255.
26. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article 3B, supra note 20 at 257.
27. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, supra Article C, note 20 at 255.
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institutional framework" based on the Community institutions (Council,
Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice), although the powers of the
institutions differ greatly depending on whether they emanate from the
Treaties establishing the European Communities or from the TEU.2 8
The one institution that was specially created for the Union is the
European Council. It is composed of the heads of states or heads of
governments. The European Council has a different role than the Council
of Ministers. The European Council provides "the Union with the
necessary impetus for its development" and defines "the general political
guidelines".29 The Council exercises the main decision-making functions
of the Union and ensures "the unity, consistency and effectiveness of
action by the Union".30 Thus, the Union is beyond question distinct
from the Member States objectively viewed by its constitutive instruments and by its function.
What is less than clear is the exact legal nature of the Union under
the TEU and its relationship with the existing three Communities. While
the provisions of the TEU draw a distinction between the Union and the
Communities that make a part of it, the TEU also contains elements
which underline the "oneness" of the Union as a whole. The common
provisions (Articles A to F) and the Final provisions (Articles L-S) apply
to the Union as a whole. Thus, for example, Article A(3) provides that
the Union "shall be funded on the European Communities" and Article
O provides for a single membership in the Union, replacing corresponding provisions in the treaties establishing the Communities. However,
unlike the treaties establishing the three Communities, the TEU does not
contain a specific provision conferring the Union legal personality.
According to the TEU 31the Union provides "itself with the means
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies". This
provision is problematic because, while it could theoretically serve as a
basis upon which to presume legal personality of the Union, it has been
32
narrowly interpreted not to confer international legal personality.

28. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article E, supra note 20 at 256.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article D, supra note 20 at 255-256.
Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.8(2), supra note 20 at 326.
Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article F(3), supra note 20 at 256.
See discussion of the German Consitutional Court, infra p. 116.
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The European Union ' Limited Powers and Instruments in CFSP
Matters.

The general objective of the European Union in the area of CFSP
is "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its
Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international
security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms"."
The Union and its Member States "define and implement a common
foreign and security policy," (CFSP)34 The separation of the Union in
external matters from the Member States is reflected in the solidarity
obligation which stipulates:
"The Member States shall support the Union's external and
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which
is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations . . .".
The main institution for the CFSP is the Council of Ministers. The
Council, acting under the political authority of the European Council,
makes the "decisions necessary for defining and implementing" the
CFSP.3 6 That is, it is the forum for discussions and mutual information.
The role of the Council of Ministers here is central because it decides
whether a matter shall be subject to joint action and it defines the
procedures for such action. The Member State holding the presidency of
the Council represents the Union in matters concerning the CFSP and the
Council is responsible for the implementation of common measures and
expresses the position of the Union in international organizations and
conferences.37
The functions of the Commission in the field of CFSP differ from

33. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.l(2), supra note 20 at 324.
34. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, supra note 20 at 324-327 (The CFSP is
governed by Articles J.1-J.I1 of the TEU.
35. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.l(4), supra note 20 at 324.

36. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.8(2), supra note 20 at 327.
37. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.5, supra note 20 at 325.
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those under the treaties establishing the European Communities. Rather
than having the exclusive right to make proposals or to exercise
comprehensive decision making powers, as in the three Communities, the
Commission is "fully associated" with the CFSP38 and shares the right
of initiation with the Member states. Both the Council and the Commission are responsible for ensuring the consistency of external relations as
a whole, including security, economic and development policies, "each
in accordance with its respective
powers".39 The Commission has not been assigned specific tasks in the
framework of CFSP, but it is associated with the external representation
of the Union.4 0 It serves the Union through its missions in third

countries'
The European Parliament carries out a consultative function on the
main aspects and basic choices concerning the CFSP.42
The Court of Justice has no powers in the area of CFSP, except the
power to examine the legality of economic sanctions against third
countries, which are implemented by the Community only after a
common position or joint action has been taken by the Union.43 The
powers of the European Court of Justice are limited mainly to matters
falling within the competence of the Communities and the final
provisions of the TEU." The administrative expenditures for the CFSP
are charged to the budget of the European Communities. The operational
expenditures to implement the CFSP, may be charged either to the
budget of the European Communities or to the Member States.45
The TEU provides the Union only with very limited powers and
instruments in CFSP matters.4 6 Such limitations, of course, suit the
Member States because it allows them simultaneously to both guard their
rights and interests and to preserve their core area of State sovereignty.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Treaty on
Treaty on
Treaty on
Treaty on
Treaty on
EC 228a.

European
European
European
European
European

Union
Union
Union
Union
Union

and
and
and
and
and

Final
Final
Final
Final
Final

Act, Article J.9, supra note 20 at 326.
Act, Article C, supra note 20 at 255.
Act, Article J.5(3), supra note 20 at 325.
Act, Article J.6, supra note 20 at 326.
Act, Article J.7, supra note 20 at 326.

44. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article L, supra note 20 at 329-330.
45. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.11, supra note 20 at 327.
46. For recent reviews and assessment of the CPSP practice, see C. Bury and P. Hetch,
Politique6tangreet de S~curit Commune, REPERTOIRE C OMMUNAtTAIRE DALLOZ October 1996,

7-70; Willaert and C. Marques, Vers une Politique trangdreet de S~curiti Commune: 9tat des lieux
in LA CONPtRENCE INTERGOUVERNEMENTALE SUR L'UNION EUROPtENNE, 253 et seq. (A. Mattera
ed., Editions Cl6ment Juglar 1996); A. Tanca, La Politique 6trang6re de Le Skcurit6 Commune de

l'Union Europ6enne en 1995, 7 EUROPEAN J. OF I., 1993, at 447.
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However, limited powers and means at the Union level hamper the
efficiency of the CFSP and may adversely affect the uniformity of action
towards third parties. After all, the past experience of European
integration, especially in the context of common commercial policy and
GATT/WTO matters, has shown that the impact of common conduct is
bound to be greater and more efficient than individual actions of the
Members States (especially where those actions differ). While an
increased impact for Europe has been an important motivating factor
behind integration in general, that integration is not fully reflected in the
field of CFSP, which takes the form of inter-governmental cooperation,
with limited instruments for its implementation.
The European Community's comprehensive (and partly exclusive)
competencies are in contrast to the limited powers and means of the
European Union in CFSP matters. The instruments at the disposal of the

Community,
as distinct from the Union, include legislative instruments, regulations,
directives and decisions, which are legally binding on the Member States,
and international agreements in the area of external relations. The
instruments available to the Union in the CFSP area include common
positions (J.2),joint action (Article J.3) and declarationsof the Union.4 7
According to Article 1(3) TEU, the Union pursues its objectives by two
methods:
(1) by establishing systematic cooperation between Member
States in the conduct of policy (Article J.2 TEU); and
(2) by gradually implementing joint action in the area in which
8
the Member States have important interests in common.
The first method aims to coordinate national policies and to improve
on the earlier so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC) that
preceded the Maastricht Treaty. The second method aims to establish
gradually a common approach of the Union in particular areas to
complement the national foreign policies of the Member States. In
principle, the joint action called for should apply to matters of important
common interest which the Union gradually implements.
A common position is meant to be more than a diplomatic
declaration. It is something which would provide a framework for
consistent action. As such, a common position may outline certain

47. Id. at 324. Declarations of the Union are not mentioned in the TEU, but are inherited from
practice prior to the Maastricht Treaty.
48. Treaty on European Union, Article J.3, supra note 20 at 324.
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orientations or strategies and define common principles for the Union
with regard to third countries or multilateral issues. The implementation
is carried out by the Member States and by the Communities, in
accordance with their own competences and procedures. Once adopted,
common positions oblige the Member States to ensure that their national
policies conform to them.49
The Member States are to coordinate their action in international
organizations and conferences and they are obliged to uphold any
common positions in such forums." Majority of common positions at
the moment relate to economic sanctions concerning Libya, the Sudan,
Haiti and ex-Yugoslavia. Issues which have not been subject to the
common position or joint action, remain a matter for each Member
State's national foreign policy.
Common positions, not surprisingly, outnumber joint actions
because they are easier to adopt and because they do not require prior
general guidelines of the European Council.
Joint action implies a more closely integrated and more disciplined
action than a common position and the TEU gives the impression that
joint action is the key vehicle of the CFSP. 1 Both common positions
and joint actions are
legally binding on the Member States. Joint actions are more definitively
and unambiquously stated than common positions because they "commit"'
the Member States to the positions they adopt by joint action (Art.
J.3(4)). A joint action addresses precise questions. For example, joint
actions were used to address the former Yugoslavia, to support the peace
process in the Middle East, to support the Stability Pact in Europe, to
support the transition to democracy in South Africa, to prepare for the
conference of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to control the exports
of dual use goods, to control the use of anti-personnel mines, and to
supervise elections in Russia.
The most often used instrument of the CFSP is the declaration.
Unlike the common positions and joint actions, declarations reflect purely
political values. The Presidency of the European Union makes declarations on behalf of the Union with respect to a particular event or
situation.
The TEU does not provide the Union with CFSP treaty-making

49. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article J.3, supra note 20 at 324.
50. Id. at 324.
51. Id. at 324-325.
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powers and so treaties are not among the instruments available to
implement the CFSP. If treaties are concluded within the framework of
the CFSP the individual member states become the contracting parties
and not the EU. 2 For example, the agreement concluded in the former
Yugoslavia conflict (a Memorandum of Understanding on the European
Union Administration of Mostar), was concluded between "the Member
States of the European Union acting within the framework of the Union
in full association with the European Commission"5 3 Normally, such
an agreement would require individual signatures of all Member States
of the Union. In this case, exceptionally, the Member States gave the
Presidency of the Council the power to sign the Memorandum of
Understanding on their behalf. Such an exceptional solution tends to
prove the rule, even though it may be justified under Article J.5(2) TEU
(which gives special responsibilities to the Presidency). Such Union
action is also problematic under the constitutional laws of some Member
States, which do not envisage the delegation of the powers of their own
government to sign international agreements.54
C. The InternationalLegal Personalityof the European Union
The Union, at first sight, seems to satisfy two prime criteria for
international legal personality--separation from the Member States and
possession of its own organs. The Union, of course, was established by
a treaty concluded by its Member States. The Union possesses permanent
organs similar to those of the Community. And the Union is separate
from its Member States, in the sense that it has distinct aims and goals.
This separation from Member States is indirectly reflected in the Treaty
provisions
for solidarity of obligation and for a principle of subsidiarity separate
from the Community.
On the other hand, the TEU did not confer on the Union treatymaking powers. Instead, its powers in the area of CFSP, are limited to
the adoption of common positions and joint actions and declarations,
neither of which require it to have international legal personality. The
functions and powers of the EU were intentionally designed by the
Member States to be restricted at the time of its creation, which argues
for the absence of discrete legal personality. That design reflects a

52. Everling, supra note 19; Curtin, supra note 19.
53. Unpublished, cited in Bury and Hetsch, supra note 46 at 8.
54. Id.
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deliberate intention to curtail the Union's role and power in international
legal relations."5 To act on the international plane, the Union must rely
either on the existing Communities, especially the EC, or on the Member
States.5 6
The German Constitutional Court, 7 prior to German ratification of
the TEU, took the view generally shared by other Member States, that
the Union was not a legal person and that the narrow powers granted it
did not make Union legal personality indispensable for the Union to
perform its functions. It rejected the exclusive competence of the Union
to decide jurisdictional conflicts under Article F(3).5" In doing so, the
German Constitutional Court relied largely on the intention of the
Member States and noted that Article F(3) "merely states the political
intention that the Member States forming the Union wish to provide it,
under the scope of the required procedures, with the means necessary to
attain its objectives and carry through its policies". It noted that
"according to the interpretation applied by the Federal Government, the
Union does not have a distinct personality either in terms of its relationship with the European Communities or with the Member States."
The Court stated that:
"the Union provides 'itself' with means in the same way as it
sets 'itself' objectives in Art. B: the Maastricht Treaty construes
the Union as a name for the Member States acting in concert, not
an independent legal entity. It is the Member States which,
through the Treaty, provide the means and set the objectives for
the Union!. 59
A different interpretation according to the Court would conflict with "the
intention expressed throughout by the contracting parties" to set forth the
principle of limited individual powers, and it would also conflict with the
"conscious decision of the Member States to exclude" foreign and

55. J. Czoos, G. REmsmc, G. ViGNEs, J. WYLAND, LE TRArit DE MAASTIuCHT. GENESE,
ANALYSE ET COMMENTAIRHEs 112 (Bruylant 1993) (This matter was criticized by the Commission
at the time of Maastricht negotiations).
56. Everling, supra note 19 at 1061; Curtin, supra note 19 at 27-28; T. Heukels and J. de
Zwaan, The Configuration of the European Union: Community Dimension of Institutional
Interaction, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ESSAYES IN HONOUR OF

HENRY G. SCHERrmRS, 195, 202 (D. Curtin and T. Heukels eds. vol. 2 1994 (Martinus Nijhoff
1994); D. NVYATTA AND A. DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 656 (1993).

57. German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of the Maastricht Treaty of October 12,
1993, 33 LL.M. 388 (1994).

58. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, supra note 20 at 256.
59. Id. at 428-429 (C. ll.2.bl-b2).
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security policy and justice and home affairs from the supranational
decision-making structures.60 Article F(3), it said, is not supplemented
by procedures which would assign specific tasks to specific institutions.
Article F(3) contains "simply a declaration of intent6 1as to the program to
be pursued," rather than a standard of competence.
The German Constitutional Court's opinion endorses the principle that
the controlling power rest with the Member States of the Union.
V. FUTURE PROSPECT REGARDING THE UNION'S LEGAL
PERSONALITY AND THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997).
The question of legal personality is not, of course, a purely technical
legal question, but a matter which is treated with a high degree of
caution by the Member States of the Union, who are anxious about its
impact and possible limitations on their national sovereignty. Such
impacts and limitations do not, on the other hand, necessarily depend so
much on the existence of the legal personality as such as on the actual
competences that the legal person would have. It is entirely possible to
grant legal personality to the European Union, even to merge with the
existing Communities and still maintain the presently existing three pillar
structure. While the Union as a whole would have one legal personality,
it would have very different competencies to act, depending on whether
a particular issue falls within Community (I pillar), CFSP (II pillar) or
Justice and Home Affairs (III pillar) activities and, correspondingly,
different decision making procedures and voting rules would apply
respectively.
It is likely that the EU in the years ahead eventually will emerge
with an intact international legal personality regardless of the present
state of law. That is not to say that the question of legal personality is
posed in a legal, political, or social vacuum.
Legally, the present Union rules reflect the possibility that the Union
may act independently and it already has done so within the limits
available to it. While the prevailing view is that the Union falls short of
being a legal person, the EU Treaty contains the legal elements to
distinguish the Union from its Member States. This is particularly
noticeable in the area of external relations, where the central objective of

60. Id. at 429 (C. 11.2 b3-b4)
61. Id. at 430 (b5-b6)
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the Union is to "assert its identity on the international scene".6 2 That is,
at least when the Union deals externally with other states, it may act as
one entity even if that entity has not reached its full maturity.
Socially and politically, the EU operates in continuous intercourse
with third states, international organizations and other actors on the
international stage. That intercourse touches on some aspects of
international legal personality and/or the lack of it. The increasing
involvement of the EU in international life generates social and political
expectations and pressures, which are likely to lead to the establishment
of a single legal personality.
At the micro level, such expectations are prompted when the
Communities and the Members States appear jointly under the sign of the
European Union in international negotiations and conferences and speak
with one voice, either through the Commission or through the Member
State holding the presidency of the Council. Such joint appearances
induce and consolidate the attitudes of third countries to treat the Union
as one entity and, indeed, as if it were a legal person. The attitudes of
third countries inevitably also affect the perceptions of the Member
States themselves on the issue of the legal personality.
Those social and political expectations also may arise at the macro
level. For example, The Protocol Concerning Elections (Annex I) in the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip 63 makes several references to the European Union which is not a
party to the agreement, but wittnessed its signature. At the same time, the
EU took a parallel joint action to support the peace process in the Middle
East. The Protocol provides that security issues relating to international
observers be dealt with within the framework of the trilateral PalestinianIsraeli-European Union forum (Art. IV(2)(c)). The Protocol also deals
with communications and questions of logistics providing inter alia:
"The European Union will act as the coordinator for the
activity of observer delegations (Art. V(4)).
The [Central Election Committee] Israel and the European
Union shall establish a trilateral forum for the purpose of dealing
with issues (for example: security of observers, communication,

62. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Article B, supra note 20 at 255.
63. Concluded in Washington on September 28, 1995. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Jerusalem)/Israel Information Center. The Interim Agreement is partly reproduced in 36 I.L.M. 551
(1997), but the above quoted parts have not been reproduced.

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[VCol. 2:37

visas, identification, and other questions of logistics) which are
raised by observer delegations as requiring assistance, or which
otherwise require coordination between the members of the
trilateral forum. Other matters relating to the conduct of the
elections may be dealt with between the [Central Election
Committee] and the European Union bilaterally. The operational
modalities of the trilateral forum will be agreed by the parties at
its first meeting. (Art. V(7))
The[Central Election Committee] and Israel will bear no
financial liability in respect of expenditure undertaken by
observers, or of injury, damage or loss incurred by observers
in the course of their duties or otherwise. The European Union
will only bear such liability in relation to members of the
coordinationg body and to the European Union observers and
only to the extent that it explicitly agrees to do so. (Appendix
2(8) to Annex II)"

Of course, such an agreement by itself does not create legal
personality for the EU. However, it does show the involvement of the
European Union as a (political) entity, and it reflects a certain external
perception of the EU as a distinct personality. It is not suggested that the
legal personality of the EU just grows out of its factual involvement in
international politics (even as the outside world increasingly treating it
as one, or as the political and social pressures increase for the treatment
of the EU as a single legal person). Despite the social and political
tendencies, it remains the legal reality that the bestowal of legal
personality is ultimately controlled by the Member States of the Union.
The legal personality of the Union was under consideration in the
Inter-Governmental Conference ([GC) opened on 29 March 1996 in
Turin and closed in 16-17 June 1997 in Amsterdam. 64 However, due
to the opposition of some Member States, any provision regarding the
establishment of legal personality of the European Union was left out
from the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997.65

64. See generally, A. Mattera (ed). La Conference Intergouvernementale sur
l'Union Europeenne. (Paris: Editions Clement Juglar 1996).
65.

Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam European Council: Draft Treaty

(June 19, 1997). Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. The
final Treaty is not yet published, but the text of Article J.14 corresponds to the final
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What was included in the new Treaty is a provision for a new facility
as regards the conclusion of agreements relating to the second and third
pillars of the Union. The Treaty provides in new Article J. 14 as follows:
"When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one
or more States or international organisations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may
authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as
appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such
agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting
unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency.
No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose
representative in the Council states that it has to comply
with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure;
the other memberes of the Council may agree that the
agreement shall apply provisionally to them.
The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters
falling under Title VI."
One may, of course, ask whether Article J. 14 should be construed as
some kind of implicit recognition of the legal personality of the Union.
Such a question could arise against the background of the jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice, especially in the above discussed
Reparationsfor Injuries case, concluding that the international legal
personality of the United Nations could be detracted from the functions
and powers given to that organisation even in the absence of explicit
recognition of such personality. Could such an approach possibly be
applied also in the case of Article J. 14?
It would seem that due constraint should be in place so as not to
read too much into a provision such as Article J. 14. The legal personality of the Union has been under serious consideration twice, in Maastricht
1992 and in Amsterdam 1997, and in both cases the proposals for
establishing the legal personality of the Union have not won the approval
of all Member States. In the light of this, it would now seem rather
difficult to argue that, the implicit intention of the Member States was,
in fact, to provide the Union with legal personality. Such reading would
seem particularly problematic in the light of the fact that, in the case of
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the existing three Communities, upon which the Union is based, the legal
personality has been established in clear and express terms. Thus, an a
contrario interpretation would suggest that one should not consider
Article J.14 as a recognition of the Union's legal personality as it would
probably not correspond to the intention of the 15 Member States as a
whole. This would indeed also find support in the actual wording of
Article J.14, especially the second sentence of the paragraph, which states
that no agreement is binding on a Member State whose representative
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure, for example the approval by its Parliament. Thus the role
of the Council is in this particular context made dependent on the
requirements of the law of the Member States. In other words, if the
legal personality is ultimately about capacity to be subject to legal rights
and obligations, that capacity, or that measure of personality, to put it
differently, is made subject to the constitutional requirements of the
Member States. Some such requirements exist in all Member States and
they vary depending on the nature of the agreement. And, of course, it
is not excluded that the fulfillment of such requirements may finally
result in the rejection of a particular agreement by one, several or all of
the Member States, which does not really suggest that they have intended
to establish the legal personality of the Union. In fact, the wording of
Article 3.14, stating that no agreement shall be binding "on a Member
State" and that some Member States may agree that the agreement shall
apply provisionally "to them", confers an idea of individual obligations
of the Member States rather than the European Union as such.
It should be added that the legal personality is not merely about
capacity to be subject of rights, but also of obligations. In the final
analysis, that capacity implies that, in the case of violation of obligations,
one is faced with the obligation to make reparation. More often then not,
that is a matter of providing monetary compensation but, in that regard,
the Union does not have the ability to meet the obligation, given the fact
that the Union does not have a separate budget of its own: the Second
and Third Pillar activities rely on the budget of the three Communities
and, possibly, separate contributions by the Member States. So, this
aspect, too, seems to support the remarks made above.
Consequently, the better view would suggest that the intention of the
Member States is that Article 3.14 entails a kind of facilitation as regards
the procedure concerning the conclusion of agreements under the Second
and Third Pillar activities. In other words, the Council is enabled to
conclude such agreements on behalf of the Member States. This would
mean that Article 3.14 should be understood as a kind of institutionalisa-
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tion of the one time ad hoc solution that was followed in the conclusion
of the Memorandum of Understanding on the European Union Administration of Mostar, where the Member States gave the Presidency of the
Council the power to sign the Memorandum on their behalf.66
VI. CONCLUSION.
This paper reflects the view that if the EU is to funtion effectively
in the future, it should be bestowed with international legal personality,
ultimately to serve the interests of its Member States. It would also be
important that such personality appears as one from the viewpoint of the
outside world. However, given the political sensitivies that some Member
States attach to the idea of legal personality of the Union it has been
rejected in Maastricht in 1992 and again in Amsterdam in 1997, although
the Amsterdam Summit took some steps in this direction by facilitating
the conclusion of interna-tional agreements related to the second and
third pillar activities of the Union. The issue of legal personality of the
Union, including its relationship to the existing three Communities, will
be subject to debate also in the future and likely to be addressed in the
future inter-governmental conferences.
One basic lesson of the discussion of legal personality of the EU is
that it demonstrates the central status that the nation-states still have in
international society generally (and in Europe in particular) and that the
grant of international legal personality is still today essentially controlled
by states.
In this regard, the nature of the play in the international stage does
not greatly differ from historical experiences on the domestic stage in
municipal societies. In both cases, the "original" members of the society
control whether or not to bestow legal personality to new groups of
actors. Little in the handling of legal personality of the EU changes that
observation.

66.
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